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COMMENTS
THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS
HALA AYOUB
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall deny equal protection or due process of
law to any person.' This restriction has been declared by the
United States Supreme Court to be applicable only to actions of
the state.5 Those states which have also granted these protections
to their citizens through constitutional provision have construed
such guarantees in the same light as their federal counterpart.8
The result is that the fourteenth amendment and its state progeny
may be used only when actions of the state cause the deprivation
of the constitutional rights of equal protection and due process.
Thus, a person who has been denied such constitutional rights
through the wrongful conduct of a private individual cannot seek
vindication through the use of the federal or state guarantees.
An exception to this rule has been carved out by the United
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in pertinent part-
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdictions the equal protections of the laws.
2. The first Supreme Court case to make this distinction was the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (discussed in detail infra at note 9 and accompanying text). The state action
doctrine applies not only to the fourteenth amendment but also to other provisions of the
Constitution. The Civil Rights Cases dealt only with the question of whether state action
was required as a prerequisite for invoking the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments.
3. Some of the states' equal protection clauses are patterned after the federal clause.
See, e.g., CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 7(a) ("A person may not be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws."); HAWAn CON T. art.
I, 15 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor be denied equal protection of the law."). Others have utilized different language. See,
e.g., ALAsKA CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("that all persons are equal and entitled to equal right, oppor-
tunities and protections under the law"); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("The equality of all per-
sons before the law is recognized, and shall ever remain inviolate.").
Only six states have determined that their equal protection clauses require state action.
They are Connecticut, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington.
4. See infra notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text. This is not to say that there is no
available remedy for an individual who has been denied equal protection by a private indi-
vidual. Both state and federal statutes have been enacted that provide redress for private
wrongs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, & 1985 (1982) (providing civil sanctions for depri-
vations of equal rights).
894 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:893
States Supreme Court so that under certain circumstances one
may proceed against private individuals.6 To determine whether
private actions fall within the aforementioned exception to the
fourteenth amendment, various tests have been established by the
Court." Because of the persuasive influence of the Supreme Court
in this area, state courts have generally adopted these tests.7 Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court has been unclear as to what the
requirements of these tests are, and as to what tests are to be used
under what circumstances. Because of this lack of direction, the
state courts have haphazardly engaged in the application of these
theories, creating inconsistent decisions among states using the
same test.$ This comment will closely examine the development of
these tests, determine where the confusion lies and suggest a supe-
rior method of analysis.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Statutory construction of the limitations of the fourteenth
amendment began with the Civil Rights Cases in 1883 when the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in
public accommodations, was declared void.9 Nullification was
5. One of the first cases to carve out an exception was Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948). In Shelley, black families who had purchased houses from whites brought an action
under the fourteenth amendment when neighbors sought to enforce a racially restrictive
covenant. Although the Court found that the "[a]mendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful," it held that significant state involve-
ment in the form of judicial enforcement of the discriminatory agreement amounted to state
action. Id. at 13, 20. It has been suggested that it is easier to find state action within the
conduct of an individual when the condoned action is racial discrimination. See Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970). For example, the earlier line of state action
cases involves racial discrimination and, in these cases, private discrimination was said to be
state action. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
For discussion of this theory, see Robinson v. Price, 553 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1977);
Lockwood v. Killian, 375 A.2d 998, 1002 (Conn. 1977); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc.,
408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 51 (N.Y. 1978). This may explain why there has been a tightening of the
state action doctrine. The recent enactment of anti-discrimination statutes lessened the
need for the use of the fourteenth amendment and the Court did not wish to expand the
doctrine for other types of deprivations. See also Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L.
Rsv. 3 (1961); Comment, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CALF. L. Rv.
146 (1976); Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. Rav. 840 (1974).
6. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 58.
9. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Act reads in pertinent part
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to
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based on the determination that the fourteenth amendment im-
posed restrictions only against the states. 0 The Supreme Court
held that
[ciivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against
State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of indi-
viduals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, cus-
toms, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an
individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private
wrong, or a crime of that individual."
This restriction was easy to apply when there was a clear indica-
tion that the state was involved. Thus, where the alleged depriva-
tion occurred through the acts of a state agency or official, or in-
volved a state law, regulation or rule, the state action requirement
was met."2 There arose other situations, however, in which it was
more difficult to determine if the alleged wrongdoing occurred
through state action. Thus, further development of the state action
doctrine followed in the mid-1900's. During this period, the Court
began to develop theories for determining when actions of a pri-
vate actor could be proscribed under the fourteenth amendent."8
Today, two tests have emerged.
The first, the "public function" test, involves the question of
whether a private individual is performing a government func-
tion.14 The "public function" test rests on the premise that, by del-
full and equal enjoyment of accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges
of inns, public conveyances . . . theatres and other places of public amusement
... and [these entitlements are] applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color, regardless of any previous conditions of servitude.
Ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
10. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-15.
11. Id. at 17.
12. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Pennsylvania v. Board of
Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
13. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (state action present when public
officials are trustees of a discriminatory trust for a city park); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (lease to a private business converted private action into
state action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (enforcement of discriminatory trust by
judicial process is state action); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-owned
town built and operated primarily to benefit the public subject to state regulation); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state delegation to a private organization of the power to
regulate primary elections is delegation of a state function, transforming the private conduct
into state action).
14. See generally Comment, supra note 5; Comment, State Action: Judicial Perpetua-
tion of the State/Private Distinction, 2 Omo N.U.L. Rev. 722 (1975) [hereinafter State
Action: Judicial Perpetuation]; Note, supra note 5.
1984]
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egating an activity to an individual that has been "traditionally
exclusively" performed by the government, a private person's ac-
tions performed under this authority become state action. Such
functions include conducting primary elections, operating a com-
pany town and maintaining a city park." Because this principle of
law has been the subject of much academic commentary, it will not
be discussed further in this comment. 6
The second test, termed the "state involvement or encourage-
ment" theory, is premised upon the idea that a private actor can
become so involved with or encouraged by the state that his con-
duct is held to be state action." Although this test has been the
subject of some previous academic discussion," there are still
many confusing issues that have not been adequately developed.
The development of these issues will be the subject of this
comment.
II. THE STATE INVOLVEMENT OR ENCOURAGEMENT THEORY
State involvement or encouragement has been an issue in cases
involving judicial enforcement of discriminatory conduct and the
giving of public funds or aid to discriminatory institutions.1 9 The
main concern in these types of cases is whether the state involve-
ment is so pervasive that it alone significantly facilitates or sup-
ports the wrongful conduct.2 0 Conversely, there exists a line of
cases concerned exclusively with the extent of connections between
the state and the private person. Out of these cases have emerged
a subcategory of state action theories-the symbiotic relationship
test and the nexus test.2 1 The Supreme Court has been hesitant to
alleviate the dichotomy created by these two concepts and has hin-
dered the lower courts in uniformly applying the tests. The result
is that lower courts are unable to discern the requirements con-
tained within each theory and are unsure when to utilize each
15. See supra note 13.
16. See supra note 14.
17. See, e.g., State Action: Judicial Perpetuation, supra note 14, at 723-24.
18. Id.
19. See supra note 11. See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state cannot
lend textbooks to a private school that maintains racial segregation policies).
20. For instance in Shelley, the Court stated that "but for the active intervention of the
state . . . petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties in question without
restraint." Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19. In Norwood, the Court found that the state could "not
grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid ha[d] a significant tendency
to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination." Norwood, 413 U.S. at 466.
21. See generally Comment, supra note 5.
STATE ACTION
test.'2 The following review of the Supreme Court cases creating
these concepts should aid the reader in understanding the require-
ments envisioned by the Court.
A. The Burton Symbiotic Relationship Test
The symbiotic relationship test emerged in Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority." There, a coffee shop located within a
state-owned parking building was leased to a private tenant for
commercial use.2 A black man, who claimed that the restaurant
had refused to serve him solely because of his race, brought an ac-
tion under the fourteenth amendment for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.' Refusing to fashion and apply a precise formula for
determining whether state action was present, the Court declared
that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attrib-
uted its true significance." 6 The Court then examined the rela-
tionship between the state and the private actor.
Finding that "[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a posi-
tion of interdependence. . . that it must be recognized as a joint
participant" in the discrimination, the Supreme Court found state
action present.27 The basis for the "interdependence" between the
state and the private entity found its root in the state lease to the
private actor. The building was publicly owned and dedicated to
"public use;" costs and maintenance of the premises were derived
from public funds and customers parked in the parking building."
22. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982)
(states that the United States Supreme Court has not fashioned a precise formula); Foster
v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (claims that other circuits have determined which
tests have continuing vitality); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir.
1977) (strong disagreement between members of the court as to which test is the proper one
to be applied); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Services, Inc., 408
So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (court recognizes fact that United States Supreme Court has
been unclear as to the correct test to adopt), aff'd, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983).
23. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
24. Id. at 716.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 722. The reasoning for this statement is that assurance of the right to equal
protection of the law was "reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right
were to be enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships which the Amendment
was designed to embrace." Id. Given this statement, it is hard to understand how Burton
later came to stand for a test that was well confined to its factual situation. If fashioning a
precise formula was an "impossible task," then the Court apparently accomplished the
impossible.
27. Id. at 725.
28. Id. at 723-24. See also Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1984]
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Taken together, these and other factors indicated that the "com-
mercially leased areas . . constituted a physically and financially
integral and, indeed, indispensible part of the State's plan. 2 9
However, the Court did limit its decision to cases where a state
leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to
have been present in Burton.30
The Burton decision was later cited for the proposition that,
under certain circumstances, a symbiotic relationship may exist be-
tween the state and a private party that will transform private
conduct into state action."1 Because the Court limited this case to
a leasing situation, the symbiotic relationship test appeared well
confined. However, in utilizing this test other courts painstakingly
manipulated the holding of Burton so as to bring other factual sit-
uations within the boundaries delineated by the decision.3 2 The
need for a more encompassing test was obvious. This trend away
from Burton began with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.5
B. The Nexus Theory
Moose Lodge involved a claim of racial discrimination by a black
man who, as the guest of a member, was refused service in a pri-
vate club.3 4 Because the state liquor board licensed the private
1965) (establishment of university made possible by surplus city buildings turns action of
university into state action); Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965)
(county lease of land for use as a golf course to private tenant who maintained racially
discriminatory policies was state action); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.
1956) (lease of basement in county courthouse to tenant who practices racial discrimination
in serving policies constitutes state action). But see Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530
F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976) (discrimination by a private club holding a lease from the city not
state action); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975) (hospital
leasing premises from the county for one dollar per year did not convert their actions into
state action); Harvey & Corky Corp. v. County of Erie, 392 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977) (county who gave lessee exclusive right to sublease premises was insufficient, standing
alone, to create state action).
29. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24. The Court listed a variety of mutual benefits that the
state and coffee shop conferred upon one another. The restaurant derived benefits such as
not having to pay higher rent due to a tax increase because the premises were held by a tax-
exempt government agency. Similarly, the discrimination by the coffee shop benefitted the
Parking Authority because the coffee shop ostensibly asserted that serving blacks would
injure its business, thereby impairing its ability to pay rent.
30. Id. at 726. See also, Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case With-
out Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1961).
31. This term was first used by the Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
175 (1972).
32. See, e.g., Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977).
33. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
34. Id. at 164-65.
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club, the plaintiff claimed the refusal of service constituted state
action for purposes of the federal equal protection clause. 5 To de-
termine the merits of the claim, the Supreme Court examined the
relationship between the state and the club. The Court found that
there was nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship as found
in Burton because the club owned its premises and was not open to
the public. 6 Moreover, the state did not take part in establishing
or enforcing the discriminatory practices. Detailed regulation did
not foster or encourage the wrongful conduct.8 7 Therefore, with the
exception later stated, the Court found that the "regulatory
scheme .. . [did] not sufficiently implicate the State in the dis-
criminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge to make the latter 'state
action.' ,e The exception noted was that a regulation promulgated
by the liquor control board did require the club to comply with its
constitution and bylaws. Because these documents were found to
contain discriminatory requirements, the Court found the result
would be to invoke state sanctions to enforce discrimination in vio-
lation of the fourteenth amendment. 9 Although it never explicitly
stated that it was moving away from Burton's symbiotic relation-
ship test, the Supreme Court pursued a new line of inquiry in
Moose Lodge. The beginning of a new test was soon recognized in
35. Id. at 165.
36. Id. at 175. More specifically, the Court pointed out that in Burton "the parking au-
thority was enabled to carry out its primary public purpose of furnishing parking space by
advantageously leasing portions of the building constructed." Id. Moose Lodge, on the other
hand, was completely severed from any connection to state property. "[While Eagle was a
public restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social club in a private
building." Id. From this analysis, it is clear that the Court felt that Burton was still limited
to its facts. However, the Court's statement that state regulation could not be said to have
fostered the discrimination must be what has led others to suggest that if the regulation had
had such an effect, then the requisite state action could have been found. Because this
would not have fit into the lessor/lessee situation, it is understandable why the Supreme
Court's treatment of these separate tests has confused lower courts. The suggestion has also
been made that Moose Lodge is actually similar to Burton because the state profited from
revenues of liquor sales. Comment, supra note 5, at 161.
37. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176-77. This view is probably the origin of the nexus test.
38. Id. at 177. State regulation of private enterprises has previously been the subject of
state action analysis. In Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), the Supreme
Court found that permitting broadcasting on public transportation was not precluded by the
Constitution. Id. at 454. In Pollak, a hearing had been held in which the challenged action
had been reviewed and the PUC directly approved the practice. As later stated in Jackson v.
Metropoliton Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974), "[a]pproval by a state utility commission . ..
where the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by
ordering it, does not transmute a practice ...into 'state action."' Id. at 357.
39. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 178-79. The effect of this finding by the Court should have
placed Moose Lodge within the line of cases holding that state action results from judicial
enforcement of discriminatory actions. See supra note 3.
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which the crucial element was a finding that the state had "signifi-
cantly involved itself" with the private party.40 The question of ex-
actly what the state had to involve itself with was expanded upon
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison.41
In Jackson, a privately owned and operated utility company ter-
minated the account of a customer because of delinquency in pay-
ments due for services. The customer brought an action for dam-
ages and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that termination of her services constituted state
action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.42 The Supreme
Court scrutinized many aspects of the relationship between the
utility company and the state to determine if state action was pre-
sent. This was accomplished by inquiring "whether there [was] a
sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged ac-
tion of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself. '43 Under this inquiry, the
Court found that the requisite nexus was lacking.
First, the Court recognized that the company was subject to ex-
tensive regulation, but found that "[t]he mere fact that a business
is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action
into that of the State. ' 44 Second, the Court rejected the argument
that a monopoly, even if one had been granted, was determinative
in finding state action because there was no nexus between the mo-
nopoly and the challenged action.4 5 Third, because the utility com-
pany did not exercise a power "traditionally exclusively reserved to
the State," the Court found no state action.46 Fourth, although the
regulated entity may request approval of a practice, the Court held
that where the state had not placed its "weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it," the private conduct could not be
attributed to the state.47 Finally, the Court found that the Burton
40. See generally Comment, supra note 5.
41. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
42. Id. at 347-48. The fourteenth amendment violation was not claimed to be a denial of
equal protection of the law but that due process had been denied. The customer claimed
that "reasonably continuous electrical services" were an entitlement under state law and
thus the termination was a deprivation without due process of law. Id. at 348 n.2.
43. Id. at 351. The case cited for this proposition was Moose Lodge. The nexus, then,
that the Court was searching for in Moose Lodge was active state pursuit of the discrimina-
tory policies.
44. Id. at 350.
45. Id. at 351-52.
46. Id. at 352.
47. Id. at 357. The provision that allowed the utility company to terminate services for
nonpayment was filed in a general tariff with the Public Utility Commission. The provision
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symbiotic relationship was not present.48 All of these arguments
"taken together" showed no more than that it was a heavily regu-
lated company with at least a partial monopoly. Under the nexus
theory, this was insufficient to connect the state to the private
company's actions.4
After Jackson, a highly relevant question became when, if ever,
would circumstances indicate that private conduct was proscribed
under the fourteenth amendment. It was hard to understand how
Burton could survive the Jackson test.'0 Did Jackson overrule
Burton or did it merely create a second test? If the latter, was the
second test separate and distinct or to be used in conjunction? 1
One of the major hindrances in utilizing the new nexus test was
that it was almost as limiting as Burton. The Court now appeared
to be searching for an action that the state had engaged in with the
private actor instead of examining the conduct of the private actor.
For instance, the Court in Burton recognized that passive activity,
such as not discouraging discrimination, was sufficient encourage-
ment to require a finding of state action. However, in Jackson,
nothing less than actual state involvement in, or positive approval
of, the violative conduct would establish the necessary nexus be-
tween the state and the private actor. A closer look at the language
in Jackson indicates that the Court intended that the nexus must
exist between the state and the challenged action. Thus, a multi-
plicity of connections between the state and the private person
became effective if not disapproved 60 days after filing. It was not found by the Court that
the utility company was required to file this provision nor that the PUC could even prohibit
the practice. Id. at 355.
48. Id. at 357-58. The Court also recognized that the holding of Burton was limited to
lessees holding public property.
49. Id. at 358. This last sentence may be the reason for the confusion surrounding the
test. All of the arguments taken together were insufficient to connect the state with the
utility's conduct for a finding of state action. This seems to suggest that the Court was
looking to the totality of the circumstances in order to find the connection. However, the
nexus test does not take into consideration the amount of connections involved. It takes
only one connection, that of direct state involvement in the challenged activity, for a finding
of state action.
50. In Burton, the only activity that the state engaged in which was held to encourage
the discrimination was inaction. The test of Jackson, however, rejects the claim that passiv-
ity can ever be state involvement. The state, by approving the termination practice and by
not directly disapproving it, was, in contrast to Burton, not encouraging the wrongful
conduct.
51. Some courts have asserted that the tests are to be used in a consecutive order; the
nexus test should be used only after application of the symbiotic test has not produced a
state action finding. See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States Catholic Conference, 548 F. Supp.
1333, 1341 n.22 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (citing Chalfant v. Wilmington Institute, 574 F.2d 739, 745-
46 (3d Cir. 1978)).
1984)
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does not satisfy the nexus test. Instead, there must exist some sort
of involvement by the state in the wrongful conduct of the private
party. Moose Lodge confirms this analysis because the close con-
nections between the state and the private club were insufficient to
implicate the state.
Since Jackson developed an analysis completely separate from
Burton, did Burton retain any vitality? Because of recent Supreme
Court pronouncements on this issue, discussed below, it appears
that Burton is alive and well but that its use is limited to the exact
factual situation for which the Court intended.5 2 The interdepen-
dence that was found controlling in Burton was only present be-
cause of the lessor/lessee relationship. 5 The very nature of a lease
establishes a relationship between parties that is absent when per-
sons independently own property. In Burton, if the state had not
been leasing premises to the coffee shop, the state would not have
been relying upon the rent paid by its tenant. No agreements
would have existed to maintain the property and the state could
not legally oblige a neighbor to engage in the activities in question.
The symbiotic relationship theory should be recognized and given
its own position within the state action doctrines. However, the ef-
fectiveness of its use depends upon a court being confronted with a
lessor/lessee relationship.
If Burton is limited to its facts and Jackson requires the state to
participate in the wrongful conduct in order to find state action,
then other courts faced with this issue should have little difficulty
applying these theories. Unfortunately, this dichotomy, which may
seem clear after a close analysis, has left the state and federal
courts in confusion. Many of the federal courts have either ex-
pressly or impliedly admitted their confusion but were bound to
try and follow the Supreme Court guidelines." The state courts
which were free to fashion their own tests, however, have followed
the Supreme Court's state action analysis in Burton and Jackson.
An analysis of the decisions of the state courts reveals the confu-
52. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
53. In Burton, the Court stated that "[ilt cannot be doubted that the peculiar relation-
ship of the restaurant to the parking facility in which it is located confers on each an inci-
dental variety of mutual benefits." Burton, 365 U.S. at 724. The only "peculiar" relationship
the court can be referring to is that of lessor/lessee.
54. The numerosity of these decisions prevents iisting them in entirety. Some of the
cases with more involved discussions are: Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 956-58 (3d Cir. 1977); Fulton v.
Hecht, 545 F.2d 540, 541-43 (5th Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Price, 553 F.2d 918, 920-21 (5th
Cir. 1977); Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 536 F.2d 1, 4-8 (3d Cir. 1976).
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sion wrought by the Supreme Court's lack of clarity. Recognizing
that discord exists in the federal system, this comment will demon-
strate the corresponding chaos in the state systems. Following this
overview, an attempt will be made to uncover the direction in
which the United States Supreme Court is heading by examining
several recent decisions. Although clarification of state action theo-
ries should have emerged through these latest decisions, this did
not occur. Hence a superior method of analysis will be recom-
mended which will clarify the process for determining the presence
of state action. This new analysis should permit state and federal
courts to uniformly apply the state action doctrine which, at least
through the present time, has been an elusive task.
III. STATE COURT TREATMENT OF THE STATE ACTION ISSUE
Interpretation of the different states' equal protection clauses
has followed a course similar to the federal construction. While
the states have guaranteed equal protection in different forms,5
each state that has been confronted with the issue of whether their
constitution requires state action has found that it does.5 7 As ex-
pected, however, the confusion of the federal decisions has carried
over to the state decisions."
55. See, e.g., State ex rel. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972) (state court not
obligated to interpret state constitution in the same manner as the federal constitution;
broader safeguards are available under the state constitution); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadil-
lac, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (state constitution can be given an independent
construction and grant even more protection than its federal counterpart); Bulova Watch
Co. v. Brand Distributors of Wilkesboro, Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 1974) (United States
Supreme Court's construction of federal constitution is highly persuasive but not binding
upon construction of state constitution); but see Fox v. Michigan Employment Security
Comm'n, 153 N.W.2d 644 (Mich. 1967) (state constitution secures same right of protection
as federal equal protection clause); Garcia v. Albuquerque Public Schools Bd., 622 P.2d 699
(N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (standards for violation of the state and federal equal protection
clauses are the same); Nyitray v. Industrial Comm'n, 443 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 1983) (limita-
tions placed upon governmental actions by equal protection clause of Ohio and federal con-
stitutions are essentially the same); Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975) (state ver-
sion of equal protection clause construed in similar manner as equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
56. See supra note 6.
57. See supra note 3.
58. Contradiction among state court decisions is prevalent. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Mid-
Cities Pee Wee Football Ass'n, 576 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (refusal by a
private football association to allow a young female to participate in the sport is not "en-
couraged by, enabled by or closely interrelated in function with state action"); Junior Foot-
ball Ass'n v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). See also Harvey & Corky Corp.
v. County of Erie, 392 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (under a Burton analysis, a lease
by a county to a private association, which in turn refused to sublet the premises, was not
1984]
904 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:893
One of the first state courts to find a state action requirement in
its constitution was Connecticut. In Lockwood v. Killian,59 the
Connecticut Supreme Court was faced with a trust that was al-
leged to be discriminatory because it contained racial and religious
restrictions. ° The Connecticut Attorney General was a party to
the action and the trial court enforced the religious trust. Because
earlier Connecticut Supreme Court cases had established that the
federal and state equal protection clauses had "the same meaning
and imposed similiar constitutional limitations," 1 the court con-
cluded that private actions inhibiting individual rights were not vi-
olative of the state equal protection clause."'
The Connecticut court turned to the Burton and Moose Lodge
cases as guidelines to determine whether the conduct was private
or governmental. First, the court noted that the Supreme Court
had never adopted a rigid formula but had relied upon a case-by-
case approach. 63 Then the court, citing Burton, stated that the
"court [was not] so significantly involved in the implementation of
the religious restriction that it can be said that state action should
be deemed responsible for what is essentially private discrimina-
tion. . . . The court merely applied neutral and nondiscriminatory
principles."" The court then went on to quote language in Moose
Lodge, which distinguished that case from Burton, stating that no
symbiotic relationship was present.65
The misapplication of the Supreme Court tests is obvious in the
Connecticut court's analysis. The court should have followed Shel-
ley v. Kraemer,6 a state action case which held that a discrimina-
tory covenant could not be enforced through the judicial process.
Burton does not apply to the Lockwood factual situation. There is
state action). But see Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 422 A.2d 1097 (Pa. Sup. Ct)
(decision correctly utilized the United States Supreme Court doctrines), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 896 (1981); Jeffery v. Weintraub, 648 P.2d 914, 920 n.7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (uncer-
tain whether a lessor/lessee situation creates state action under present Washington law);
MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of Am., 600 P.2d 1027 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 635 P.2d
683 (Wash. 1981).
59. 375 A.2d 998 (Conn. 1977).
60: Id. at 1000.
61. Id. at 1001.
62. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20 reads: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his
or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestory, national origin or
sex."
63. Lockwood, 375 A.2d at 1002.
64. Id. at 1003.
65. Id. at 1004.
66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also supra note 5.
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no lease involved, nor are any of the qualitative connections be-
tween the state and the private actors seeking to enforce the trust
present. Furthermore, if the court desired to center attention upon
state participation in discriminatory conduct, Jackson could have
been utilized.
Although Connecticut incorrectly used the state action tests, the
same cannot be said of Florida, which not only recognized the con-
fusion in state action theories but also correctly applied the tests.
In Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Ser-
vices, Inc.,7 a handicapped individual brought an action against
his employer and its insurer for deprivation of employment due to
his infirmity."8 Schreiner contended his dismissal was an unconsti-
tutional deprivation under Florida's equal protection clause.6 In
reviewing this contention, the Florida First District Court of Ap-
peal stated that the United States Supreme Court's finding of a
state action requirement for the fourteenth amendment was not
binding.70 Regardless of this freedom from federal precedent, the
court found that the state equal protection clause contained a state
action requirement.
The next issue confronted by the court was whether Schreiner's
private employer's and insurer's activities constituted state action
so that Florida's equal protection clause would be applicable to
their alleged discriminatory practices. The employer, a trucking
company, and its insurer were both regulated by the state.7 1 Based
on this regulation it was contended that there was a sufficient rela-
tionship between the state and the employer so that the action of
dismissal by the employer was converted into state action.7 ' The
court rejected this argument.
In declining to accept this position, the court noted that "[tihe
federal judiciary has never clarified the extent to which either the
67. 408 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
68. Id. at 713. The question of whether epilepsy was a physical handicap for purposes of
the constitutional provision was assumed for this case only.
69. The Florida Constitution provides in part: "All natural persons are equal before the
law .... No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, or physical
handicap." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
70. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 715. The court pointed to the differing treatment of this
question by other state courts. Some states were found to construe their state constitutions
within the limits and rights imposed by the federal constitution. Other states were said to
follow only parallel provisions of the federal constitution while others felt their state consti-
tution provided greater protection. Id. at 715 n.5. See also supra note 55.
71. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 717-18.
72. Id. The parties did not brief this point but the issues were raised by the court itself
as possible state action sources.
1984]
906 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:893
symbiotic relationship or close nexus theories must be satisfied
before state action can be found to exist."7 The court also stated
that it was unsure which theory must be used in assessing whether
state action was present. Various federal circuits were found to
have differed in their views as to the weight to be given the two
theories.74 After examining the general trend of the United States
Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, the Florida court concluded that the favored ap-
proach was utilization of the close nexus theory.75
After recognizing the conflict among the various state and fed-
eral courts and finding the nexus test to be the one currently in
vogue, the court concluded that, under either approach, neither a
nexus nor a symbiotic relationship existed.76 Because state regula-
tion alone was the only relationship between the state and the pri-
vate company, a symbiotic relationship was not present. 7 A nexus
73. Id. at 717.
74. Id. The court recognized that the circuits have accepted the idea that Jackson did
not overrule Burton and that there is a manner in which the two can be reconciled. The
court then went on to subscribe to the theory that the Burton symbiotic relationship test
still retained vitality after Jackson. Id. at 717 n.10.
75. Id. At the time of this case, the Eleventh Circuit had recently been established and
the Schreiner court recognized that they would be bound by the Fifth Circuit until other-
wise informed. Since then, the Eleventh Circuit has spoken with regard to the state action
doctrine. See Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1982); Jeffries
v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982).
In Jeffries, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the relevant inquiry was whether a suffi-
ciently close nexus existed. 678 F.2d at 923. The court was confronted with a state agency
which participated in the termination and eviction process of tenants by their landlord.
Recognizing that intimate government involvement by way of regulation or provision of ben-
efits will not necessarily require a finding of state action, the court here found that there
was other evidence which, when taken with the government involvement in regulation, was
sufficient to sustain the lower court's finding of state action. The thought the court was
attempting to articulate is that the single fact of a close degree of involvement between the
state and the private actor may cause the actions of the individual to be transformed into
state action even though the state is not involved in that particular challenged activity. The
court found that the state agency 'has so far insinuated itself with the private owner in
carrying out the [private] challenged eviction procedure' that the nexus between the state
and the private action 'is both firm and close."' Id. This analysis combines the Burton
"interdependence" factor with the close nexus requirement of Jackson.
In Daniels, the Eleventh Circuit followed its earlier pronouncement in Jeffries of the
state action doctrine with a confused statement. The court claimed that if the "complaining
party can demonstrate that 'there is a sufficiently close nexus [or symbiotic relationship]
between the State and the challenged action . . . [then] the action . . . may be fairly
treated as that of the state itself." 692 F.2d at 1333 (citation omitted). This interpretation of
the state action requirement succinctly demonstrates the utter confusion reigning in the
circuit courts.
76. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 717.
77. Id. at 718. The use of the symbiotic relationship test should not have been made by
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between the state and the allegedly discriminatory action (dismis-
sal from employment) was also lacking because it was not shown
that the state participated in the decision of dismissal."
The Florida Supreme Court approved the decision of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal.7 9 Thus in Florida the theory to which courts
would adhere is the nexus doctrine. The Florida court correctly ap-
plied the United States Supreme Court concept by analyzing the
actions of the state in conjunction with the challenged activity in-
stead of merely examining the existence of certain connections be-
tween the two.80
The states' treatment of the state action issue demonstrates that
they have attempted to follow the requirements that the Supreme
Court has found emanating from the fourteenth amendment. The
application of these theories, however, has produced varying re-
sults. The blame for this situation can be placed upon the Supreme
Court which, while attempting to be flexible in approaching the
various factual circumstances presented in state action cases, has
inadvertently done exactly what it said should not be done. In es-
tablishing the symbiotic relationship and close nexus tests, the
Court has created rigid formulas that induce lower courts to search
for similarities between their cases and those of the Supreme Court
and has not invited analysis on a case-by-case basis.81 The solution
to this problem is for the Supreme Court to enunciate a theory
unconfined to any limiting factual situation. The Court was faced
with just such an opportunity in several recent cases.
the court under the given factual circumstances. The court could have merely dismissed
state action under this theory by finding no lessor/lessee relationship between the state and
the regulated industries. There was no need to find that regulation does not create a symbi-
otic relationship because the threshold requirement of a lease was not met.
78. Id. The court also recognizes two other possible sources of state action. The revoca-
tion of the driver's license by the state could have been the source of a nexus but the court
found that the connection between this act by the state and the challenged activity of the
private actor (dismissal) was much too attenuated. Second, the use of the judiciary for
resolving this conflict did not implicate the state in the actions of the private actor. Id.
79. Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Management Services, Inc., 432 So. 2d
567, 568 (Fla. 1983).
80. Schreiner, 408 So. 2d at 718.
81. This factor may explain why the Court has confused its followers with the Burton
symbiotic relationship test. Realizing that the Supreme Court had taken the stance that no
precise formula should be utilized, courts looking to Burton for guidance would have been
skeptical of limiting its application to a lessor/lessee situation. Courts must have been con-
vinced that Burton stood for more. It is easy to understand, therefore, how Burton came to
stand for more than was ever intended.
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IV. THE LATEST SUPREME COURT PRONOUNCEMENTS
The latest development of the state action doctrine resulted
from three recent Supreme Court cases which, when read together,
define the parameters within which the search for state action is to
be conducted. The first case is Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 82 in
which a private party sought prejudgment attachment of his
debtor's property.8 The writ of attachment was executed by a
county sheriff.84 The attachment was later ordered dismissed be-
cause Edmondson did not establish the grounds for attachment in
the petition."'
An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was brought against Edmond-
son on the grounds that the company had acted "under color of
law" to deprive the debtor of his property without due process of
law.8 6 In reaching the decision that state action was present in this
case, the Supreme Court stated that the requirement of state ac-
tion for purposes of the fourteenth amendment and the "under
color of law" language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the same.87 The in-
quiry used was a two-part approach in which a determination must
be made as to whether the "deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly
attributable to the State."" The two-part approach first requires
that the deprivation "be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible" and,
second, that the party responsible for the deprivation "be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor." 9 The Court stated that
without such a rule a party could be challenged for a constitutional
deprivation if he merely relied on a state statute or regulation. Ad-
82. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
83. Id. at 924.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 925.
86. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
87. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. at 929. However, the Court stated that even though a find-
ing of state action under the fourteenth amendment will satisfy the "under color of law"
requirement of § 1983, the same could not be said about "under color of law" conduct satis-
fying the fourteenth amendment state action requirement. Id. at 935 n.18.
88. Id. at 937.
89. Id.
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ditionally, the Court noted that the two principles, while related,
are not identical. If the case dealt with a party who has official
character such that the weight of the state is behind his decisions,
then the principles collapse into one another, but if the party is a
private entity, then the principles diverge."0
Two illustrations of this two-part approach were provided by the
Court. The first example presented was the Moose Lodge case, in
which the Court claimed the focus was on whether the discrimina-
tion in question could be ascribed to any governmental decision. It
was found that the regulatory scheme enforced by the Pennsylva-
nia Liquor Control Board did not implicate the state in the wrong-
ful conduct. Any government decision that did affect Moose Lodge
was unconnected with the challenged activity."1
The second example discussed was the case of Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks,92 in which the use by a private party of a self-help provi-
sion of the state Uniform Commercial Code was challenged as state
action. The Court in Flagg applied the two-prong inquiry and
found the first test was met, but not the second. The state was
responsible for the statute, but the action by the private party pur-
suant to the statute was not sufficient to justify characterizing that
person as a state actor. Therefore, the Court found no state action
present.93
In Edmondson Oil, the Court found that both prongs of the
"fairly attributable" test were satisfied. The state, as in Flagg, was
responsible for the "procedural scheme" of the statute." Unlike
Flagg, however, there was a state actor involved because the sheriff
was a joint participant in exercising the writ. Therefore, the
"under color of law" requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was
satisfied. 5
The next state action case decided that day was Blum v. Yaret-
90. Id. This illustration is rather an awkward one because it initially appears that, for a
private entity, the two prongs need to be independently analyzed. As later indicated, this is
an incorrect construction. The divergence only requires that both facets fall within the state
action doctrine and a different analysis for each prong is unnecessary. The distinction be-
tween the private and official character was merely to indicate that with the latter less needs
to be shown.
91. Id. at 938.
92. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
93. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. at 939.
94. Id. at 941. As the dissent points out, "[respondents did no more than invoke a pre-
sumptively valid state prejudgment attachment procedure available to all." Id. at 943.
95. The "joint participant" theory is derived from Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144 (1970), which held that joint participation by a private actor with a state official in
discrimination was state action under § 1983. Id. at 152.
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sky. 96 There a nursing home whose patients were Medicare recipi-
ents determined that some patients could be discharged or trans-
ferred to lower levels of care. In response to this transfer, the state
reduced or terminated the patients' Medicare benefits. The pa-
tients, claiming their right to due process had been violated be-
cause they had not been afforded notice or a hearing, commenced
suit against the state under the fourteenth amendment. 7
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found state action
present.98 Because the state "responded" to the transfer decisions
by adjusting the Medicare benefits, the nexus requirement of
Jackson was satisfied." The Supreme Court reversed this decision
and rejected the accompanying rationale. In so doing, the Court
recognized the fact that this case was different from other state
action cases in which a private actor is accused of state action.
Here, the state allegedly denied fourteenth amendment rights
through its responsibility for regulating the conduct of the nursing
homes.100 The other state action decisions, however, were found to
provide guidance in the analysis needed to resolve the issues in
this case.
The first principle announced was that the mere fact of state
regulation does not convert private conduct into state action. A
nexus must also be found between the state and the challenged
action. Second, a state can be held liable for exercising coercive
power or significantly encouraging, either overtly or covertly, a pri-
vate party. Finally, the Court stated that the nexus may be present
if the private entity has exercised a power "traditionally the exclu-
sive prerogative of the State." Under these principles, state action
was not found.101
The nexus was not satisfied because the response by the state
was not the challenged activity; rather, it was the decision to dis-
charge that was being challenged. State response through adjust-
ment of payments was held not to render the state responsible for
those actions. 10 2 Further, the decision to discharge was a medical
96. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
97. Id. at 995-96.
98. Yaretsky v. Blum, 629 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
99. Id. at 820.
100. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1002-03.
101. Id. at 1005.
102. Id. The argument was also rejected that the state "affirmatively commands" the
discharge. There was no regulation by the state which ordered such conduct. The require-
ments of the pertinent regulation stated that transfers should be done according to need
and the state provided the forms for the transfer.
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judgment and thus could not be attributed to the state since it was
made "in accordance with professional canons of ethics, rather
than dictated by any rule of conduct imposed by the State."'0 3 The
Court also rejected the argument that a relationship existed be-
tween the state and the hospital, created by regulation and subsi-
dizations, so that the state was a joint participant in the deci-
sion.' Although an attempt was made to use Burton, the Court
found that it did not encompass situations where private business
was extensively regulated. Finally, the operation of a nursing home
was found not to be a function "traditionally exclusively" the pre-
rogative of the state.105
The last state action case to be determined by the Court that
day was Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.'06 In Rendell-Baker, a non-profit
private school that specialized in educating children with excep-
tional needs was claimed to have discharged its personnel in viola-
tion of the first, fifth and fourteenth amendments. Suit was filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.107 Citing Edmondson Oil, the Court stated
that a person is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the
"alleged infringement of federal rights [is] 'fairly attributable to
the state.' ,,os The Court then turned to Blum to decide whether
the action was attributable to the state. 0 9 Because dependency
upon state funds and extensive state regulations were rejected as
foundations for finding state action in Blum, they were also re-
jected in Rendell-Baker. More importantly, the decision to dis-
charge the personnel in Rendell-Baker was not compelled or influ-
enced by the state and the state "showed relatively little interest
103. Id., at 1009. The Court found the case to be similar to Polk County v. Dodson, 452
U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk, a public defender who represented indigent defendents was found
not to be acting under color of state law because his professional duties were dictated by his
professional ethics, not by the state.
104. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1010-11. The Court side-stepped having to decide if these factors
were sufficient to constitute a symbiotic relationship by resorting to Jackson's nexus re-
quirement. But see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 848 n.1 (1982) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (viewed separately, these are insufficient factors to establish state action; neverthe-
less, the "cumulative impact" would necessitate a state action finding).
105. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011.
106. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
107. Id. at 834-35.
108. Id. at 838. Yet, in Blum, the Court stated that fair attribution was to be the test
when there is enforcement of state laws or regulations by state officials who were parties to
the suit. Neither of these factors was present in Rendell-Baker.
109. Ironically, the Court in Blum did not state that the question was one of fair attribu-
tion. Yet, the Court in both Rendell-Baker and Blum conducted its analysis in terms of the
then-existing state action doctrines.
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in the school's personnel matters."11
As in Blum, the Court found that the case did not fall within the
"public function" doctrine because a special school was not a func-
tion "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state."'' Fi-
nally, the symbiotic relationship argument rejected in Blum was
also rejected in Rendell-Baker. The Court stressed that in Burton
the restaurant was leased from the state and the state profited
from the discrimination by receiving rent. Here, the relationship
between the state and the school was said to be more akin to a
contractor who was employed by the government." 2
A. The Current Status of the State Action Doctrines
It is difficult to assert, after the decisions rendered in these three
cases, that the status of the state action doctrines is less ambigu-
ous than before. One issue, however, has been determined. The vi-
tality of Burton remains intact. A proposition stated earlier in this
comment also remains unscathed. A symbiotic relationship can
only be found when a state leases property to a private party. The
reason behind this proposition is found in the language of Rendell-
Baker where the Court emphasized the receipt of rent by the state
from the coffee shop in Burton."13 There appears to be a "suste-
nance" requirement in Burton; without the rent money, the state
could not operate its parking premises and, without the rental
premises from the state, the coffee shop might not be able to con-
tinue its operation. Thus, a symbiotic relationship should only be
found when a lease exists."4
The most pertinent question to be raised after the recent state
action trilogy is: To what status has the Jackson "nexus" test been
relegated? If the "fairly attributable" test has been given the pre-
mier spot in state action doctrines, has the nexus theory become a
110. Id. at 841. It appears by this statement that the state would have to directly order
or participate in the decision to dismiss.
111. Id. at 842 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 843. After this decision was rendered, one court argued that this dicta rein-
stated the Burton symbiotic test. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 n.7 (4th Cir. 1982).
But see Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 451 (1st Cir. 1983) (court
construed this same language in Rendell-Baker as stressing the importance of the lease and
the payment of rent).
113. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842. See supra note 31.
114. See, e.g., Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Services, Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 451 (1st Cir.
1983) (in discussing the critical facts in Burton, the court stated that: "Most importantly,
the profits the restaurant earned through discrimination were indispensible [sic] elements in
the financial success of the government agency").
STATE ACTION
nullity? Jackson is referred to throughout the Rendell-Baker,
Blum and Edmondson Oil decisions. Yet, if the Court is still using
the test, why does it state at the beginning of Rendell-Baker that
the question in determining if state action is present under the
fourteenth amendment is whether the challenged conduct is fairly
attributable to the state? " The explanation lies in the fact that
the "fairly attributable" test will not always be used in a state ac-
tion analysii. The basis for this statement is derived from Blum,
where the Court states that there are two types of state action
cases. The first situation involves a private party's conduct that
has "sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State" so that the
private action is converted into state action. The second group of
cases involves a challenge to the enforcement of state laws or regu-
lations by state officials who are themselves parties to the suit. In
such cases, the question is whether the private motive that trig-
gered the enforcement of those laws can fairly be attributed to the
state.1 6 For the former group of cases, the Court cites Flagg, Jack-
son, Moose Lodge and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co." 7 For the lat-
ter, the Court cites Peterson v. City of Greenville,"8 in which a
city ordinance made it unlawful to seat whites and blacks together
in a restaurant.
This analysis can be reconciled with the distinctions made in
Edmondson Oil. The Court in Edmondson Oil stated that if a pri-
vate entity is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct then the
two prongs of the "fairly attributable" test diverge. The example
given was Moose Lodge, which represents the beginning of the
nexus test. This is comparable to the statement in Blum that in
such types of cases an "imprimatur" must be found. These state-
ments can be construed to mean that the Court requires an overall
finding of state action which includes both state participation in
the activity through laws, regulations or policies and state execu-
tion of the activity. Moose Lodge failed under this analysis because
the discrimination did not emanate from the state laws or
regulations.
The next statement by the Court in Edmondson Oil was that the
tests "collapse" if the activity is carried out by a party with official
character. This is equivalent to the Blum Court's statement that
115. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839-40.
116. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003-04.
117. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
118. 373 U.S. 244 (1963). The flaw in this assertion is that Flagg should have been cited
for this proposal because it involves exactly this type of situation.
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the second group of state action cases involves enforcement of
state laws or regulations by a state official. This requirement
means that the only factor for which state action must be shown is
that the actor is a state actor. There is no need to show state ac-
tion in the challenged activity because it came directly through the
support of state laws or regulations. Thus, as exemplified in Flagg
Brothers and Edmondson Oil, there was no need to determine if
the deprivation was created through state action because it was de-
rived from state law.
In sum, the "fairly attributable" test has not made a nullity of
the nexus test. It only defines the point in time when the test
comes into play. Therefore, the nexus test will be used at the same
time as the other state action theories. This point in time occurs
whenever it must be demonstrated that the challenged activity is a
result of state decisions or, in other words, whenever it must be
shown that an "imprimatur" exists.
Hence, the relevant inquiry is: What constitutes an "imprima-
tur?" Given the cases cited for this proposition and the fact that
Rendell-Baker and Blum are still analyzed within the nexus/
symbiotic relationship tests, "imprimatur" is just another way of
stating that the court must be presented with state sanctioning of
the challenged conduct. This would include demonstration of an
"imprimatur" by establishing the existence of a public function, a
nexus, or a symbiotic relationship. Furthermore, all but the nexus
theory have remained untouched by the decisions. However, the
seemingly well-defined concept of a nexus may have been given a
broader scope after Blum because there may now be more circum-
stances to which it may be applied.
The Court in Blum stated that the nexus test is satisfied if the
private entity has exercised powers that are "traditionally the ex-
clusive prerogative of the state." ' This presents a conflict among
the state action theories. How is it possible that, on the one hand,
the Court states that the nexus can only exist between the state
and the challenged decision and that, on the other, the test can be
satisfied by a private entity exercising a public function but with
no specific approval of the challenged activity made by the state?
If the nexus is satisfied by a private actor performing a public
function, then the'purpose of the nexus theory will be defeated.
There will be no assurance that the state is responsible for the spe-
cific conduct which is challenged. Instead, by merely performing a
119. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005.
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public function, the nexus is automatically satisfied so that all ac-
tivity engaged in by the private actor becomes state action.
Two explanations for this new language are possible. The use of
the word "nexus" could be considered loose language, the connota-
tion of which was not meant to denote the nexus test. Possibly, the
intent was to state the availability of the public function doctrine,
a separate branch of state action inquiry, but instead an unfortu-
nate choice of words was made. Conversely, there may have been
an intent to expand the nexus to a relationship between the state
and private actor so that when an entity exercises a power "tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the state" it automatically will
have engaged in state action. This construction may initially ap-
pear absurd but actually is very similiar to the effect that the Bur-
ton case created; it is very limiting. As of late, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated little inclination towards characterizing any
function as traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.20
Thus, the Court may have no need to worry about a deluge of cases
contending the presence of state action.
A summation of the propositions of the revised state action doc-
trine may be helpful in understanding where the Supreme Court
now stands. Fourteenth amendment state action and 42 U.S.C. §
1983 "under color of law" state action use a similiar approach in
determining if the prerequisites are met. The test used is whether
the deprivation of the federal right is fairly attributable to the
state, which is a two-part inquiry. Both parts are not always to be
separately analyzed. If the challenge consists of enforcement by a
state actor of a law or regulation then the two inquiries collapse.
The inquiries diverge if a private entity is challenged under the
"fairly attributable" theory. The tests to be used to show that fair
attribution is present when a private party is involved are the state
action doctrines that have evolved up until this period. The "fairly
attributable" test does not supersede these concepts; it merely de-
fines when they are to be used. Of these doctrines only one, the
nexus test, may have been altered by the Supreme Court, although
the change may have a minimal effect.
The attempted clarification by the Court of the state action doc-
trines has not been accomplished. Rather, a review of the few cases
decided after Blum, Rendell-Baker and Edmondson Oil indicate
120. The special needs school in Rendell-Baker, the utility company in Jackson and the
nursing home in Blum were all found not to be traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
state. The public function doctrine was mainly used for finding election primaries to be a
public function. See supra note 13.
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that courts are still as puzzled as before in deciding which is the
correct state action theory to be applied under certain
circumstances.
B. Application of Recent Supreme Court State Action
Decisions
The latest Supreme Court cases have been discussed in federal
decisions which have questioned whether private action falls
within the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment. A close look
at these cases reveals that the lower courts are still unsure as to
the requirements and differences between the nexus and symbiotic
relationship test. For instance, in Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing
Home,121 a discussion by the concurring judge reveals that the di-
chotomy between the two tests is still misunderstood. In articulat-
ing the test to be used under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the concurring
judge correctly states that the deprivation of federal rights must be
found to be fairly attributable to the state.122 The facts of the case
are not analyzed by collapsing the two tests together because the
suit is against a private nursing home who was said to have been
negligent in its care of a patient.1 23 No state laws, regulations or
state officials were involved. Therefore, the two prongs diverge and
the "state must be shown to be sufficiently connected with the par-
ticular aspect of the defendant's conduct complained of" so as to
find state action. 24 The tests for analysis are then presented, and
it is here that the confusion is apparent.
After stating that the public function test and the coercive
power theory may be used, the concurring judge then claims that a
party can demonstrate that "there is a sufficiently close nexus [or
symbiotic relationship] between the state and the challenged ac-
tion" of the private entity.1 25 This is an erroneous statement. The
two tests are separate and distinct. In the nexus test, no matter
how strong the relationship is between the state and the private
entity, only participation by the state in the challenged activity
will result in a state action finding. On the contrary, it does not
matter if the state is involved in the decision to engage in the
wrongful conduct for a symbiotic relationship to be found. Instead,
121. 692 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1982).
122. Id. at 1333.
123. Id. at 1322.
124. Id. at 1333. It is not clear whether this analysis was accomplished in recognition of
the distinction made in Edmondson Oil or if it was accidentally completed.
125. Id. (emphasis in original).
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there must exist such an overwhelming amount of dependency be-
tween the two bodies that the actions of one become the actions of
the other.
Another federal case to exemplify the existing confusion is Ad-
ams v. Bain.12 1 In Adams, an employee of a volunteer fire depart-
ment claimed he had been deprived of his employment without
due process of law and brought an action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.127 Pertinent to the status of the state action theories is the
discussion, in a footnote, of Burton. The court declared that Bur-
ton is not limited to its facts due to dicta in Rendell-Baker. The
court then states that "[i]f there is such a symbiotic relationship in
the present case, it would ordinarily follow that the volunteer fire
department was exercising an 'exclusive public function.' ,1128 This
analysis is incorrect. The "interdependence" required in Burton
does not emanate from a relationship between the state and the
private party involving a private function. Instead, the interdepen-
dence is a result of a multiplicity of activities taken by each entity
that are beneficial to one another. It does not follow that, by en-
gaging in services of a public variety, a private actor benefits the
state. As depicted by Burton, it was the commercial nature of the
coffee shop which benefitted the state. Moreover, it was because
the state was the lessor to the coffee shop that it benefitted from
the activity. More than likely, the court retrieved this rationale
from the aforementioned language in Blum which defined the
nexus as being satisfied by the public function doctrine.
What these federal cases demonstrate is that after Rendell-
Baker, Blum and Edmondson Oil, the Supreme Court has not
come any closer to understanding the nexus/symbiotic relationship
dichotomy. This can be attributed to one main factor, the inability
of the Court to clearly articulate the state action doctrine. By this
time, the reader should have an understanding of the difficulty the
Court has encountered in developing a coherent doctrine. The mul-
tiplicity of circumstances presented by each case clearly eliminates
the possibility for developing a precise formula. Yet, the approach
the Court has taken is useless. It has created a variety of very nar-
row tests which, if a case does not fall within the finely delineated
strictures of these theories, eliminate any possibility of a finding of
state action. Of course, this may be the intent of the Court so as to
126. 697 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1982).
127. Id. at 1215.
128. Id. at 1219 n.7.
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limit the use of the fourteenth amendment. Even if this is the case,
the Court should not have done so by creating an unuseable frame-
work. Instead, the Court should establish a state action theory that
is equally applicable to all circumstances. It does not necessarily
follow that more cases will be found to have state action present.
This development would merely allow clarity in the law. In order
to create a new test, the Court must establish an underlying state
action theory which is both flexible and understandable. The re-
sulting test should be adaptable to a wide variety of situations, but
should also possess clear enough guidelines to prevent confusion or
manipulation.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Creating a new state action test does not require much imagina-
tion because most of the answers can be derived from understand-
ing the problems pervading state and federal court decisions. As
far as possible a test should not be limited to any one factual situa-
tion. This cures the Burton problem which has perplexed potential
users of the theory who have been unable to ignore the factual lim-
itation placed upon the symbiotic relationship test. The first factor
that should be present in the state/private actor relationship is a
multiplicity of connections. This factor is an extension of the nexus
test which does not consider multiple connections. 2 9 However, the
Court should not only look to the quantity of connections but
should also impose a quality requirement.130 Inherent unfairness
would occur if a multitude of minor connections could satisfy the
first hurdle. Thus, in the first inquiry the factors of quantity and
quality should be balanced. If a few connections between the state
and a private actor involved a compelling argument for interdepen-
dence, then the quality requirement will have been satisfied. If
there were a multiplicity of connections which were so minor as to
be negligible, however, then the inquiry would end and no state
action could be present. An example of the former is Rendell-
Baker. In that case only two connections, funding and state regula-
129. Although the nexus test as enunciated by the Jackson court involves only the re-
quirement of state involvement in the challenged activity, the minority in Rendell-Baker
expresses its opinion that the nexus test involves more than mere state involvement.
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 844.
130. This requirement was recognized in Rendell-Baker when the dissent stated that the
majority was correct that, taken separately, regulation and funding were insufficient to find
state action. The dissent then argued that the factors should not be viewed in isolation from
one another but their cumulative impact should be considered. Id. at 848 n.1.
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tion, would satisfy the test because of the strong qualitative fac-
tors. In the latter category, Jackson exemplifies a failure of the
test because regulation along with other minor factors does not sat-
isfy the test. It is true that this line of analysis encompasses more
cases within the state action strictures as depicted by Rendell-
Baker. Yet this approach allows the state action doctrine to func-
tion as more than just an "empty formalism." 13 1
Assuming the first inquiry has been completed, a second factor
should be considered. Actions of the state that are considered in
any analysis should include passive as well as active state involve-
ment. The essential ingredient in this respect is knowledge. If the
state is cognizant of the challenged activity and chooses not to pre-
vent it, then for all purposes encouragement of the activity is tak-
ing place. " 2
Support for this proposed state action test can be found among
the dissenters in the major state action cases. For instance, in
Jackson, the dissent stated that "Burton made clear [that] the dis-
positive question in any state action case is not whether any single
fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of state involve-
ment, but rather whether the aggregate of all relevant factors com-
pels a finding of state responsibility."'3 3 This stance is again taken
in the minority opinion in Rendell-Baker, where it is stated that
the majority was in error to analyze "the various indicia of state
action separately, without considering their cumulative impact."''
The essential feature that the dissent is emphasizing is an overall
analysis of the facts which, in essence, is what a case-by-case ap-
proach is supposed to accomplish.
Because the dissenters have referred to searching for a "cumula-
tive impact," the name for this new theory is conveniently availa-
ble. Moreover, no radical departure from previous decisions needs
to be made. Only flexibility is being added-the product of this
clarification is to provide workable, clear guidelines to the state
and federal courts.
It should now be obvious that there does exist an analytical
131. Id. at 852.
132. But see Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 422 A.2d 1097 (Pa. Sup. Ct.) (al-
though the regulation required filing of proposed rates, the regulation did not require that
the insurance commissioner review each filing), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981). In such a
situation, knowledge could only be attributed to the state if it had actually reviewed or been
informed of the rates.
133. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted).
134. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 848 n.1.
19841
920 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:893
framework in which all factual circumstances can be viewed while
simultaneously maintaining uniformity. The new theory is well
suited to this area of law because of the unlimited factual circum-
stances that can be encompassed within its boundaries. State and
federal courts would no longer have to resort to weakly searching
for similarities between a confusing host of prior decisions and the
case before them. Instead, the courts will now be able to do what
the United States Supreme Court had intended-they will be able
to employ the test on a flexible case-by-case basis.
